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Article 5

LYNN HUNNICUTT

Calling Economists
In his pamphlet entitled, Whether
Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, Luther
addresses the question of calling and
whether some callings are false. The
cover letter to the honorable Assa von
Kram notes that “…you and several
others asked me to put my opinion into writing and publish it
because many soldiers are offended by their occupation itself”
(Luther 93). This and a related question—what sort of work can
be properly classified as a vocation?—deserve reflection to reach
a deeper understanding.
Like Luther, I have reached the conclusion that economists,
too, can be saved and that my vocation as a professor of
economics and my students’ careers as learners (and eventual practitioners) of the discipline can be proper vocational
callings from God. This essay will give a brief description
of how these questions have arisen in my life and work and
consider where vocation does (and where it could) intersect
with the discipline of economics. I will touch on the question
of defining a “proper” vocation as it relates to how one characterizes preferences in economics. However, a full comparison
of vocation and preferences will have to be the subject of
another essay.
In Fall 2002, I was in my fifth year as an assistant professor
of economics at Utah State University. My research was proceeding at a reasonable pace and I was meeting my teaching
and service obligations, so tenure (while not guaranteed)
seemed likely. Yet I had the distinct and nagging sense that
Utah State was not the place for me to make a career. Part of

this was for personal reasons—but the sense of mis-fit was
deeper than that, and had to do with the separation I felt of
faith from work. Professors at public universities must take
care to separate religious faith from what is taught in the
classroom, and I believe that this separation is important
at any university. But in Utah, where it is impossible to live
without bumping up against religious faith and its effects on
everyday life, this seemingly artificial separation bothered
me. If Luther was right, and every person has a vocation (a
calling from God to a particular kind of work in the world)
then it ought to be possible to live out this calling as part
of a life of faith, instead of separate from it. I longed for a
workplace where I could more overtly talk about and live my
life of faith.
Not surprisingly, an opening at Pacific Lutheran
University that Fall struck me as a calling. The background
sense of searching I had been experiencing made the listing
(in my field and at a university owned by my church) seem to
be exactly what I’d been waiting for. God was calling me—
what else could I do but apply?
As it turns out, I was right in ways I could not have imagined. Since arriving at Pacific Lutheran, I have been drawn
into the University’s Wild Hope Center for Vocation. This
work has given direction to my own sense of calling, and
more importantly to my work with students, both inside and
out of the classroom. It has also afforded me the opportunity
to think deeply about vocation and its relationship to my
role as a faculty member.
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Whether Economists, Too, Can be Saved
Luther begins his essay by noting that there is a distinction
between the occupation of soldier, and the soldier (man) himself. He then notes that ultimate salvation depends not on the
occupation one holds, but on the grace that comes through
faith in Christ. Since acts do not save, no war (no matter how
justified) will earn salvation. The remainder of Luther’s essay
is divided into three parts. In the first part, he argues that the
occupation of soldier can be godly, for a number of reasons.
He then goes on to conclude that some wars are justified and
therefore godly. Finally, Luther argues that the person who
holds the occupation of soldier can be godly, and that soldiers
may work for pay. Interestingly, Luther sketches out a simple
model of the feudal economy, in which soldiers provide protection for farmers, who (in turn) feed soldiers. He writes,
The farmers feed us and the soldiers defend us. Those
who have the responsibility of defending are to receive
their income and their food from those who have the
responsibility of feeding, so that they will be able to
defend. Those who have the responsibility of feeding are
to be defended by those who have the responsibility of
defending, so that they will be able to provide food. (128)
This is a rudimentary version of the circular flow diagram
taught in economics courses today, with the soldiers purchasing inputs (food) from farmers, and providing an output
(protection services) to those same farmers.

“Is the call to economics as a field a
proper vocation?”
Now an economist is not a soldier. We are not called to take
up arms against others. And yet, our policy prescriptions affect
human lives and can, on occasion, lead to human suffering and
even death.1 We are seen, by some, as promoters of greed—as
facilitators of acquisitiveness. Of course, self-interest, which is
assumed in the standard modeling framework (Walsh 401-405),
and greed are not the same, but the confusion of the two is
common. And so the question arises: Can an economist, too,
be saved? Is the call to economics as a field a proper vocation?
As with soldiers, one may distinguish between the
person and the occupation. As Luther notes, a man sometimes “takes a work that is good in itself and makes it bad
for himself by not being very concerned about serving out
of obedience and duty” (129). What matters is the reason
the role is undertaken. Thus, one who “seek[s] only his own
profit” is not right or good, even when the work is justifiable
(129). Motivation matters. Yet the question remains whether

a person may be saved even as they serve in an “unjustified”
occupation (if such a thing exists).
Luther himself was a professor, and remained so even after
he began the reform movement within the Catholic church.
Thus, it seems clear that Luther would agree the role of professor is a proper vocational calling, as long as one does not use it
to seek money or favors. But what about economics as a calling?
Can one legitimately profess economics? Perhaps a distinction
can be made between the field and the occupation. As a professor of economics, I am called, first and foremost, to profess.
Economics is the discipline I am trained in, and the topic I
profess most regularly, but it is through this profession that I
serve both my students and colleagues. This is my vocation.

Self-Interest and Being-Called
Is the profession of economics, then, an unethical thing?
After all, doesn’t economics promote self-interest above all
and help devise ways for firms and individuals to obtain
more at the expense of other people (including unborn future
generations), non-human creatures, and the earth? Am I
not training little self-interested (greedy) creatures to build
empires and exploit the world around them? You will not be
surprised to learn that my answer to this question is “no”—
with some qualification. For one thing, “study of” is not the
same as “advocacy for.” While it is true that rational selfinterest is a foundational assumption in almost all economic
modeling, this is a statement of the human condition, not
necessarily an assessment of its desirability.
Adam Smith, the founder of modern economic theory,
defends the distinction between self-interest and mere
greed. In both of his two major works, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776), 2 Smith
assumes that self-interest is not in-and-of-itself morally
objectionable. He writes:
We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective in selfishness. This is by no means the weak side
of human nature, or the failing of which we are apt
to be suspicious… Carelessness and want of economy
are universally disapproved of, not…as proceeding
from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the
proper attention to the objects of self–interest. (Moral
Sentiments XII.II.87)
And yet, what Smith here describes as mere human
nature and neutral motivation for economic action was for
Luther the root of sin. Indeed, closely related to self-interest
is Luther’s view that people are “curved in on themselves.”
Yet notice that, for Luther, the condition of being curved in
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on oneself is morally objectionable; it closes us off from God
and the needy neighbor. It is the duty of the Christian to live
life in service to the common good. What is this life lived in
service to the common good? Luther’s answer: Vocation.
Unlike Luther, then, economists take self-interest as a
starting point and use the assumption to better understand
human action, not its motivation. This is the point of departure, and also where economics ceases to consider vocation as
it is understood in other disciplines. Thus, to ask a mainstream
economist to consider vocation is tantamount to asking her to
move into some distant and slightly uncomfortable vacation
rental home, with its coffee maker that doesn’t work in the way
she’s used to and the neighbors who speak a dialect that she has
trouble understanding. It might be possible, even pleasurable,
but it is not quite like home where she knows which drawer
holds the apple slicer.
In short, the economist takes no position on this fundamental aspect of the human condition. Instead, she considers
the world as it exists, through the lens of self-interest. Indeed,
most economists would say this is not properly a part of
our discipline. It is a foundational assumption that is rarely
noticed, and even less commonly questioned.
In other words, if being self-interested is morally neutral,
then no claims regarding who should be served can be made.
The economic agent is left alone, to serve who he wills in his
self-interested way. This is not to say that each person has the
capacity to fulfill all of his needs, but rather that by invoking the self-interest of others, his own needs are also satisfied. Self-interest, not direct attention to the neighbor’s need,
becomes the root of true benevolence. As Smith writes in his
later work:
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from
their benevolence only…It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of
their advantages. (Wealth of Nations 13)
Smith further notes that as long as markets are free and
information is easily available, self-interested is guided, as
if by an invisible hand, to improve society’s general level of
welfare and therefore the welfare of others. It is possible to go
even further and explain altruistic behavior while remaining
within the realm of self-interest, so that people are concerned
with the welfare of others and the common good due to their
self-interested nature (Andreoni; Becker). But this concern
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for the welfare of others is not the same thing as vocation.
Economics has no sense of responding to a call to serve the
common good in the way that Luther describes vocation.
Instead, because the discipline assumes self-interest, serving
the common good is a result which must be shown to come
from a reinterpretation of self-interest.

“This concern for the welfare of others
is not the same thing as vocation.
Economics has no sense of responding
to a call to serve the common good in
the way that Luther describes vocation.”
Now, this setting aside of moral questions regarding human
nature has enabled economics to make great strides in describing the world around us. Metaphors like Smith’s invisible hand
or Marshall’s scissors of supply and demand (Marshall V.III.7)
help us understand the nature and advantages of markets as
a way to organize economic activity. Advances like David
Ricardo’s description of gains from trade (ch. 7)—the idea
that engaging in trade can make both trading partners better
off—suggest that individuals and countries are better off with
open economies than with closed. Cournot’s use of mathematical models to describe competition between firms has enabled
new discoveries and relatively accurate accounts of outcomes
in many industries (ch. 4-8). In all of these cases, self-interested
behavior was assumed, never questioned. Vocation simply
doesn’t arise in this work. Furthermore, many of these ideas
would be difficult, if not impossible, to describe if the writer
had to justify the use of self-interested behavior before presenting his theory. What McCloskey calls “prudence only”—at
the exclusion of the other virtues—has gotten us a long way
(“Bourgeois Virtue” 297-317).

Accounting for Vocation
Since the question of who should be served does not arise in
mainstream economics, the discipline is left without obvious
tools to address questions of vocation. This is not seen as a
problem, as mainstream economics does not often see a need
to consider vocation. That said, the work of two economists
(among many others whose deserving work is not mentioned
here) questions both the assumptions of the mainstream economic model and the desirability of the discipline’s so-called
neutrality on ethical issues. This work might provide a way
to consider vocation while remaining within the discipline of
economics, at least as broadly construed.

First, Deirdre McCloskey has written a number of works
in which she questions the assumptions economists make.
Starting with The Rhetoric of Economics, and through The
Bourgeois Virtues, McCloskey points out that mainstream
economic analysis relies on only one of the seven classical
virtues, that of prudence. She notes that this limited view leaves
us unable to address many questions of interest (which, I would
say, includes questions of vocation), and causes some of our
claims to be silly, at best, and harmful, at worst. This idea that
the discipline might properly address other virtues, while still
remaining recognizably economics, could provide a way to
incorporate questions of vocation and the common good into
economics. It could also lead us to more sensible conclusions
and away from what McCloskey calls the “the unexamined
rhetoric of economic quantification” and “the rhetoric of significance tests” (Rhetoric of Economics, ch. 7-8).

“This idea that the discipline might
properly address other virtues,
while still remaining recognizably
economics, could provide a way to
incorporate questions of vocation and
the common good into economics.”
Second, George DeMartino has called for the discipline of
economics to address questions of ethics in a more rigorous way.
The consideration of who is harmed by the actions of economists is an ethical question that DeMartino suggests needs to
be addressed. Who should be served is a closely related topic
that will naturally arise as DeMartino’s challenge is addressed.
And this question leads directly to what I define here as vocation. Economic ethics does not necessarily (or only) imply an
economic understanding of vocation. It might also provide an
avenue into the question of what should occur. “Should” is not a
word that mainstream economics is well-equipped to address,
although it is a necessary word for thinking about vocation.
As it stands, mainstream economics does not, and for
many cannot, address vocation. Because we take self-interest
as given, questions of calling and serving the common good
cannot be completely or perhaps even adequately addressed.
This, I believe, is a loss for the discipline. While it seems safe
to conclude that economists, too, can be saved—even those
who have no interest in virtues other than prudence or in
questions of ethics—our discipline would be enriched by the
addition of those who work outside the standard paradigm.
So, then, I issue this call to action: Let us go forth and find
ways to talk about vocation, even as we remain economists.

End Notes
1. An example of the way the decisions of economists affect human
lives can be found in the causes of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Many economists conclude that government actions taken at the
behest of economic policymakers either caused or contributed to the
duration and severity of the depression. See “Symposia: The Great
Depression” in Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:2 (Spring 1993).
Among the causes considered are government monetary and fiscal
policies as well as nations’ adherence to the gold standard.
2. While self-interest is generally assumed in The Wealth of
Nations, it is one of many human characteristics addressed in Smith’s
other major work, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. This work, then,
is necessary background reading for The Wealth of Nations, and it is
unfortunate that some consider only Smith’s second book without the
context given in the first.
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